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“The Franco-German friendship is rich in memories and gestures that are at once important and symbolic, 
and that characterize the exceptional nature of the relationship between our two countries,” reflects former French 
economics minister and European Commission President Jacques Delors.1  Such symbolic acts and joint memories are 
not primarily about cooperation in specific instances. Rather, more generally, they denote what it means to act together. 
They lend significance to a relationship; they signify what is “at stake,” or what it is “all about.” They are about a 
deeper and more general social purpose underlying specific instances of cooperation.2  They are about the value and 
intrinsic importance that social relations incorporate. Symbols contribute to the institutionalization of social meaning 
and social purpose in dealing with one another. In this paper I clarify the concept of “predominantly symbolic acts and 
practices among states,” systematically explore such acts for the bilateral Franco-German relationship between the late 
1950s and the mid-1990s, and scrutinize the specific meaning and effects that these practices have helped to generate 
and perpetuate. 
Predominantly symbolic acts are gestures, rituals, and ceremonies that do not directly aim at the solving of 
problems, the formulating of interests and positions, or the making of policies. Typically, such acts make reference to a 
larger historical and cultural context which reaches beyond the time horizon of immediate daily politics. Principally 
symbolic acts are a distinguishable class of practices. 
Symbolic practices generate and perpetuate meaning and social purpose in the international sphere. They 
construct normality and normal expectations, shape reference points for the success or failure of specific policies, and 
engender rudiments of collective identity at the international level. Thus, they affect what states want and do, and foster 
international stability and order. In the Franco-German example, symbolic acts help to institutionalize Franco-
German relations as a value and, often, as an end in themselves. 
The dominant Franco-German post-War meaning originates in a string of symbolic acts between 1958 and 
1963. During this period, in a series of often stirring gestures and speeches, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer 
generated and instituted new and transformed meaning and social purpose for an incipient era of Franco-German 
proximity. 
A host of chiefly symbolic acts has reproduced, perpetuated, and corroborated the meaning and purpose of the 
Franco-German relationship that these two men instituted. Some of these practices are more or less regularized and 
recurrent. Their dates are marked on the calendar, such as the commemorations and celebrations of the signing of the 
Elysée Treaty, and the custom of first visits or first receptions of new top personnel after changes in key public positions. 
Others, including Kohl and Mitterrand’s memorable holding hands in Verdun in 1984, among many more, are as 
single events meaningful integral threads of an overall fabric. Singular, they are part of a whole. 
The dominant Franco-German purpose of the past four decades has its characteristic normative justifications 
or explanations in the two countries’ political discourses. For the most part, these appeals are historical. They refer to 
the necessity to overcome a long history of anguish and suffering; allude to cultural affinity; or hint at the Franco-
German role in providing stability or consolidation in European affairs. 
The symbols of the Franco-German post-War relationship give answers to questions such as: What is the 
meaning of references to France and Germany as “tandem,” “couple,” or “pair”? What is the social purpose 
institutionalized by this “special relationship”? Symbols help us understand why these relations matter. They clarify 
why this relationship is sometimes an end in itself, and why it is often a reason for and an underlying influence on the 
goals and actions of France and Germany. Without comprehending the status of symbols, their substance, and their 
effects, it is not possible to capture sufficiently what makes relations meaningful and gives them purpose. 
The issue of the presence and potential relevance of the social content (or non-content) of the international 
sphere is a central point of contention between social constructivism – or “thick” institutionalism in its various 
formulations – and materialist and rationalist perspectives on international affairs. Many now consider the cleavage 
                                                 
1 Delors 1998c, 3. All translations from French and German into English in this article are my own. 
2 As Delors elaborates: “… so many moments when France and Germany have not simply cooperated with 
each other, but where the fact of having acted together has profoundly changed the perception of the other.” 
Ibid. 
between these theoretical macro-perspectives on things social among the most fundamental and intellectually stimulating 
in the field of international relations.3  In contrast to materialist approaches, where structures are primarily or 
exclusively viewed as material, constructivists think of structures in social terms: interaction processes, understandings, 
knowledge, “relationships.” As opposed to rationalism’s individualist ontology, constructivists operate with a holistic 
and relational ontology of intersubjective meanings and shared practices, irreducible to the properties, preferences, or 
choices of the atomized actors in the system. For those concerned with identifying and empirically substantiating social 
content in the international sphere, these questions are crucial: Where does certain institutionalized meaning come from? 
When, why, and how did it become dominant and persistent? How is it re-created, re-produced, perpetuated? 
Differing with rationalism and materialism on ontological, empirical, and explanatory grounds, much 
constructivist work focuses on “the social fabric of world politics.”4  Practices produce intersubjective meanings that 
shape the features of the international community and features of  “the many communities of identity found therein.”5  
However, even though the social meaning that such activity contributes is irreducible to the effects of other international 
practices, constructivist scholars have not yet conceptually addressed chiefly symbolic practices and their effects on the 
international institutionalization of meaning and purpose.6 
In theorizing and empirically analyzing international social structures, their practices, and their effects, 
scholars working in different constructivist veins have proceeded in a variety of ways. Alexander Wendt, for example, 
broadly distinguishes among three systemic macro-cultures, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. Distinct logics of 
anarchy, they are defined by variations in basic relationship patterns among states as enemies, rivals, or friends 
respectively.7 Sociological institutionalists have explored the content and effects of a set of system-wide institutions 
enmeshed in an expanding and deepening Western world culture. Such global social structures constitute actors, shape 
actors’ properties, and define legitimate goals for them to pursue. For example, they define the meaning of modern 
statehood, with both organizational and behavioral implications in international relations.8 And adherents of the 
English school of international relations have investigated formal and informal rules, procedures, and principles 
constituting and regulating modern international relations. Originating in early modern Europe, these historical 
creations have become defining institutions of the global society of states.9 
However, many patterns of interaction and meaning in the international system are historically and spatially 
more differentiated than Wendt’s tripartite vision is able, or even aspires, to grasp. Much institutionalized systemic 
meaning and purpose is also regionally and even bilaterally considerably more variable than the sociological 
institutionalists’ focus on the world polity’s dominant cultural constructions allows for. The same applies to the scope of 
the set of originally European, then global institutions and organizing principles that the English school has explored. 
Building upon existing constructivist scholarship, this paper draws attention to symbolic acts and practices. 
Doing so implies a taxonomic differentiation that broadens and is a useful conceptual addition to systemic constructivist 
thought. The concept of symbolic practices enables us to capture consequential institutionalized meaning and purpose – 
social content of the international sphere –  which a conventional analytic apparatus, constructivist or rationalist, is 
unable to reveal.10 
                                                 
3 They include Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein 1996; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Keohane 
1989; Ruggie 1998b; Wendt 1999, chapter 1. 
4 Checkel 1998, 324, see also 327. For basic works outlining the constructivist-institutionalist perspective on so-
cial phenomena, see Jepperson 1991; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; March and Olsen 1984; March 
and Olsen 1989; Ruggie 1998a; Wendt 1999. For this perspective’s theoretical roots and philosophical under-
pinnings, see Berger and Luckmann 1966; Ruggie 1998b; Searle 1995. 
5 Hopf 1998, 179. 
6 Symbolically generated Franco-German meaning, for example, is irreducible to regularized intergovernmental 
interaction and international relations’ parapublic underpinnings, which I conceptually differentiate and empiri-
cally substantiate in Krotz 2002c and Krotz 2002d. 
7 Wendt 1999, chapter 6. 
8 See, for example, Meyer et al. 1997; Scott and Meyer 1994; Thomas et al. 1987. For an overview, see Finne-
more 1996. 
9 See, most notably, Bull 1977; Bull and Watson 1984; Reus-Smit 1999. 
10 The abundant European literature on Franco-German affairs, which has described the empirical reality of 
With respect to the particular empirical domain and historical period that this paper examines, a conceptual 
focus on symbols makes it possible to construct a narrative that brings together a host of symbolic Franco-German 
practices between the late 1950s and the end of the century. As isolated events all of these episodes and pieces are well 
documented. However, only the conceptual tool that this article develops provides the means to assemble these manifold 
incidents and occurrences into a coherent whole, to comprehend their connectedness, and to appreciate the social meaning 
with its characteristic effects that these symbolic acts generate and perpetuate in their entirety. 
In sum, in this paper I pursue three goals. First, I distinguish the concept of  “predominantly symbolic acts 
and practices among states” and define symbolic acts as a distinct category of international practice. I provide the 
conceptual framework to capture important international social content as well as to appreciate the effects of such 
meaning and social purpose. Second, with this conceptual addition, I systematically explore the empirical manifestation 
of such acts, and the meaning and purpose they help to institutionalize, for the bilateral relationship between France 
and Germany between the late 1950s and mid-1990s. I specify their substance and review their meaning. Third, I 
propose to view symbolic practices and their effects as elements of international social structure of interaction and 
meaning, and, as such, to consider them and the meaning they embody as ontological building blocks of international 
life. Doing so, in this paper I connect symbols to a social-structural style of international analysis. Both conceptually 
and empirically, this article attempts to fill a gap in the literature. It is as much about the “special” Franco-German 
relationship as it is about important ontological issues in international relations theory. 
I. Symbolic Acts as a Category 
Symbolic acts are a distinct category of international political practice. Their effects are not 
reducible to other types of international activity. They help to shape the stage on which 
much of daily politics unfolds. 
What They Are 
Predominantly symbolic acts and practices among states are international interactions 
by public officials, representing their states, that do not directly aim at solving political 
problems or serving immediate policy-making. Chiefly symbolic practices further differ from 
other international activity, such as regularized intergovernmental relations or crisis 
diplomacy, in that they follow their own schedule. This schedule is often disorderly and 
incongruent with the calendar of regular intergovernmental working relations. Together 
symbolic practices form a distinguishable class of phenomena. They have their own reality 
and tradition. 
Symbolic acts are not necessarily restricted to sets of relations with only two or a few 
parties involved. However, as political scientist Wilfried von Bredow maintains, they may be 
of particular relevance in bilateral affairs. For example, the “staging of bilateral relations, 
such as official state visits, very often transcends the dimension of sober working relations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Franco-German relations in detail, at times focuses on the social meaning and purpose institutionalized by sym-
bolic practices. Conversely, however, this body of literature, while it suggests similar arguments to those which 
I put forth in this paper, neglects its findings’ conceptual and theoretical implications. 
interstate politics.”11  “The present behavior of state actors is determined to a high degree by 
perception patterns and experiences of the past. The ‘foreign policy memory’ is fed in the 
first place by – more or less positively or negatively  assessed – bilateral experiences.”12 
The symbolic practices, meaning, and social purpose that this paper empirically 
details indeed refer specifically to Franco-German relations, rather than Franco-German 
relations.13 This does not mean, however, that this paper makes the case for “special” or 
“unique” relations between the two – irrespective of the standard practice in France and 
Germany. Symbols endow relations with a consequential qualitative dimension. This is not 
specific to the Franco-German relationship. 
What They Do 
Predominantly symbolic practices generate, reproduce and perpetuate, and 
corroborate or extend social meaning and purpose in the international sphere. They 
construct international social content. They lend significance, for example, to relations 
among specific states. They frequently make reference to a larger historical and cultural 
context that reaches beyond the time horizon of immediate daily politics. They take on some 
historical raw material that they interpret in a certain way (rather than other possible ways) 
through their very exercise. Thus they connect the present dealings of a relationship with the 
past and provide direction for the future.14  By infusing meaning and social purpose into 
relations, symbols affect international relations in three important ways. 
First, symbolic practices generate standards of normality and deviance. Such standards 
include normal expectations and  “normal demands” from certain relations – by those 
directly involved as much as by those surrounding the institutionalized relationship. 
Elements of normality encompass the framing of what can and cannot legitimately be 
wanted and done, and what can and cannot reasonably be expected and achieved. They 
also include the definition of normality of conduct in major and minor, general and 
                                                 
11 von Bredow 1996, 110. 
12 Ibid., 109. 
13 The difference in emphasis is adapted from Ruggie 1993, see especially 8. 
14 Predominantly symbolic practices, and the institutional reality of meaning and purpose of relations among 
specific states more generally, are often embedded in a broader historical and cultural context to which they re-
fer and in which they take place. In the Franco-German case, this historical-cultural context comprises its own 
terminology, common “places of memory,” and emblematic personnel. I empirically and theoretically explore 
this cultural-historical context that embeds relations among states for the Franco-German experience in Krotz 
2002a. 
specific matters among those involved in a relationship. They elucidate: What is normal 
behavior? What surprises and irritates? And they help to define “normal,” acceptable, 
and bearable levels of harmony, tension, and conflict in relationships. 
Sets of relations, whether bi-, mini- or multilateral, vary widely regarding normality of 
conduct or normal levels of harmony and conflict. They also differ widely in what satisfies 
normal expectations. In the Franco-German experience of the past four decades, one side 
may, for example, accuse the other of acting against the spirit of the relationship – a 
violation of self-constructed normality standards with its pre- and proscriptions – to which 
the many symbolic practices have substantially contributed. 
Second, the meaning institutionalized by symbolic practices shapes reference points 
for evaluating the success of policies or sets of policies in given time periods. It is the social 
context of legitimate purpose, which symbols co-constitute, that establishes this yardstick. 
Such reference points vary across time and space. 
Because “Franco-German friendship” has been a widely shared value for some four 
decades in both countries, the achievement of communal projects or joint initiatives could 
be listed as political successes. Similarly, those politically responsible have taken credit for 
avoiding Franco-German disagreements or tensions, especially in times when this appears 
difficult. Paradigmatically, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt still proudly 
pronounces – almost two decades after he left office – that while he was chancellor and 
Giscard d’Estaing the French president, “one will find no differences in views between the 
two of us in the archives for the seven common years, but a number of successful joint 
initiatives.”15  The motivation for this and innumerable similar statements from dissimilar 
personalities in a wide range of positions from both sides of the Rhine would make little 
sense apart from a social context of shared meaning that licenses such fixtures of normative 
reference. 
Third, symbolic practices engender rudiments of collective identities on the international 
level, however embryonic or tenuous, and help to define “otherness.” They frame who 
belongs to whom, for what reason, and for what purpose. Symbols are part of a social 
fabric that provides reasons for actors to hang together and act together. Conversely, 
symbols also clarify who does not belong together, who are “the others,” opponents or 
                                                 
15 Schmidt 1999. 
enemies. 
In the recent Franco-German experience such effects find expression when ex-
Chancellor Schmidt argues with reference to the according social meaning that “it is true for 
today as it is for entering the next millennium: Our place is on France’s side.”16  Such 
meaning makes France and Germany belong together and gives the two states reasons to do 
things together. It also helps to explain why German social democratic icon Herbert Wehner 
refers to collective belonging in his now classic verdict on Franco-German relations: 
“Without France everything is nothing.”17 
The effects of symbolic acts along all of these dimensions may vary widely. However, via 
these three causal pathways, symbolic practices breed social meaning and purpose that 
are consequential and effective in their own way: they affect what states want and do, 
and foster international stability and order. 
As an integral part of an international social structure, symbolically generated meaning 
helps to frame state interests which shape policy. Symbolic practices engender meaning 
and social purpose which, in specific policy areas and time periods, affect what states 
want and do; i.e. what governments define as national interest and their policy conduct 
resulting therefrom. Meaning and purpose legitimize and make intuitive certain wants 
and deeds, and delegitimize and make less plausible others. 
Some of the best informed long-standing observers of Franco-German affairs have 
noted for some time the effects of the Franco-German relationship, a specific pattern of 
interaction and meaning, as a motivating factor on what the two states’ governments define 
as the respective French and German interests. For example, “The imperative of Franco-
German cooperation,” observes newspaper editor Günther Nonnenmacher, “is in both 
countries firmly and above all political parties firmly anchored as a foreign policy ‘reason of 
state.’”18  Grasping their deeper purpose, he reflects that they “have defused innumerable 
crises of the everyday business of politics, as the principle of cooperation has been put up on 
so high a pedestal so that it could after all no longer be touched by current quarrels.”19  
                                                 
16 Schmidt 1996. 
17 Quoted, for example, in Schmidt 1999. 
18 Nonnenmacher 1997. “Franco-German cooperation is being judged so highly in its significance,” Nonnen-
macher notes elsewhere, “that both sides care about not letting any dark spots fall on it.” Nonnenmacher 1993. 
19 Nonnenmacher 1998. 
Political scientist Gunther Hellmann records that the maxim of searching for “consensus 
and moving together (Zusammenrücken) between French and Germans” has remained intact 
after the Cold War; he considers it a “central pattern of thought that shapes behavior 
(zentrale handlungsleitende Denkmuster) … [and] that coins the vast majority of the foreign policy 
establishment of the Federal Republic, beyond the borders of party affiliation.”20  Symbols 
preserve and perpetuate the desirability and legitimacy of Franco-German cooperation and 
friendship well beyond immediate objectives. Inducing interests and policies, they make 
specific instances of cooperation intuitive and plausible. 
Finally, the meanings that symbols produce by constructing normality, anchoring 
failure and success, and generating collective identity in specific sets of relations, lend 
stability to international affairs. Whatever symbolic practices’ particular manifestations, they 
“produce predictability and so, order.”21  Such stability and order is not defined as harmony 
or the absence of conflict or even violence, but as the absence of randomness, excessive 
fluctuation, and chaos. Institutionalized meaning and social purpose provide a stage on 
which much of daily politics unfolds. Such meaning structures, conditions, and channels the 
flow of everyday politics. 
II. Franco-German Meaning and Purpose 
Franco-German relations are value-charged. Often they are more than mere instruments to 
specific ends. “I want to remind with solemnity,” Delors puts it plainly, “that Franco-
German relations constitute their own value, irreplaceable for each of our two peoples.”22  It 
is “a friendship for its own sake,” he submits and reminds of the often “emotional character 
of the relation that goes beyond reason and necessity.”23  Hubert Védrine, key foreign policy 
advisor to François Mitterrand, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, comprehends “this bilateral 
relationship … [as] already an objective in itself.”24  Karl Lamers, CDU foreign policy 
spokesman and advisor to Chancellor Kohl, elaborates: “This value is anchored in the will of 
the two peoples to establish between them a bond that goes beyond a thousand and five 
hundred years of history, made of periods of coexistence as of confrontations, and their 
                                                 
20 Hellmann 1995, 19. 
21 Hopf 1998, 178. 
22 Delors 1998c, 2. 
23 Delors 1998a, 205-206. 
24 Védrine 1997, 67. 
common future.”25 What is this value in itself, end of its own, friendship for its own sake? 
Why is this relationship itself frequently taken as something valuable, “good”? What is the 
meaning that Franco-German relations embody? What does the meaning mean? What is the 
deeper social purpose of these relations that explains why they matter? France and 
Germany’s is a close relationship between dissimilar collective personalities. Their relations’ 
underlying social purpose has at least three specific normative anchors. 
France and Germany 
Their generally cooperative relationship since the 1960s notwithstanding, France and 
Germany have remained – in many respects – deeply dissimilar social compacts. The way 
French and German elites have thought about their countries and the roles of their 
respective states in the international arena have continued to diverge profoundly. As a result, 
French and Germans have frequently upheld fiercely disparate foreign policies. There are 
strong forces that often push France and Germany apart in what they want and do.26 
Many of those involved in Franco-German affairs sense that there is nothing 
“natural” about tight Franco-German relations. Because they apprehend that there are 
consequential forces that frequently induce diverging French and German interests, 
positions, and reflexes, they know that mastering Franco-German relations remains an 
ongoing process. As Védrine perceptively notices: “One always must reintroduce energy and, 
if I further may say so, pass the baton from one generation to the next.”27  President 
Mitterrand similarly expresses this understanding: When interviewed a few days before the 
25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty he was asked, “What do you see as the necessary pri-
orities for the 25 years ahead?” He responded archetypically: “going ahead, persevering.”28 
This attitude finds expression in various formulations. They state that in order not to fall 
back into rivalry or yet worse historical evils, that which the two countries have together 
achieved over the past half-century requires permanent defense by “moving ahead” with 
joint activity. Franco-German affairs remain an ongoing task to be mastered: French and 
Germans have done much, but they need to do more.29 
                                                 
25 Lamers 1998b, 183. 
26 On French and German domestic collective constructions and the effects of such constructions on foreign 
policy, see Krotz 2002b. 
27 Védrine 1997,  67. 
28 Mitterrand 1988. 
29 Compare Lamers 1998a. I quote these instances as representative of many others that could be cited. An-
Properly, one may term this shared understanding the “moving ahead for a task to be 
mastered” or the “unfinished business” aspect of these relations. It implies the constructed 
imperative “to continue to keep going (Weitermachen, Weitergehen)”30 – by infusing new energy 
and substance into the relationship: “stagnation is stepping backwards.”31 
What the Meaning Means and Why It Matters 
Although largely outside the tides of domestic political dispute, there are at least 
three major normative anchors that justify the Franco-German relationship’s intrinsic value 
and explain why it matters. Sometimes these particular justifications, explanations, defenses 
come in combinations: the necessity to overcome a bloody history of war and suffering; the 
cultural affinity between France and Germany; and the view of France and Germany as the 
cornerstones of stability of European international affairs or European integration. These 
are very strong justifications. Perhaps with minor exceptions regarding the second one, there 
has been no real opposition to them in post-war Europe. 
 
Overcoming a History of Anguish and Suffering (“A Centuries-Old Rivalry”). The most important and 
frequently-cited explanation of the intrinsic value of good and fruitful Franco-German 
relations is grounded in the shared social purpose of the need to “overcome history” of war, 
conflict, and cruelty – to set aside that “which has separated us for centuries,” as Adenauer 
puts it in his memoirs.32  “The three devastating wars which France and Germany have 
fought within less than eighty years must be the end point of a history of anguish and 
suffering,” is a typical reference to this element of meaning. Veteran reconciler Joseph 
Rovan places Franco-German relations in a wider historical context: “It took twenty-three 
Franco-German wars since the époque of Charles V and François I to finally create Europe. 
Nineteen of these wars took place on German territory, four on French territory.”33  
As the Rovan quote illustrates, this justification frequently refers to the long 
historical period beginning with the split of the empire in 843. The rivalry between François 
                                                                                                                                                 
other typical way to put the matter: “The Elysée Treaty remains a task to be fulfilled.” See, for example, Delors 
and Lamers 1998; Lamers 1998b, 184. Along the same lines, President Chirac writes about the need to “give 
new soul to our relationship” and argues “for a renewal of Franco-German relations” after the German federal 
elections of September 1998 – Chirac’s way to put the “moving ahead” matter. Chirac 1998. 
30 Hellmann 1995, 22. Hellmann critically paraphrases this element of meaning “flight ahead.” Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Adenauer 1967, 408. 
I and Karl V is now often seen as the beginning of a long era of fraternal rivalry and war. An 
end to this conflict has long been overdue, this first explanation stresses. It also implies that 
the post-1945 achievements demand continuous effort and commitment, defense and 
consolidation. 
However, it is the First World War – still present, particularly in the French, but also 
in the Franco-German collective memory – which remains a main crystallization point. This 
war, with its system of trenches from Switzerland to the North Sea, is the most Franco-
German of all wars in which French and Germans, their ancestors – or at least participants 
later claimed as ancestors – have fought and killed on opposing sides. Although it is now 
commonly considered the first mechanized mass war in history, more French and Germans 
killed each other with direct enemy contact than in any other war – with gunshots on sight, 
hand grenade fighting of few meters distance, bayonet or saber stabbing, or, as we know 
from the works of Ernst Jünger, beating each other to death with their bare hands or any 
available object.34  The First World War remains the “Great War,” la Grande Guerre. 
Residents of those parts of France and Germany that belong to that former 
Lotharingian-Frankish middle strip, where “the dream of the lost Carolingian unity has never 
fully become extinct,”35 remember this war more strongly than in Germany’s Eastern and 
France’s southwestern areas. Yet, every little French and German town has its war memorial 
listing “those who fell.” These memorials typically begin with names indicating deaths from 
1914 to 1918. There are usually more names connected with dates beginning in 1939. 
However, the memorials start with those of late 1914; they frequently evoke the impression 
that 1939 and the following years were only the bloody continuation of a memorial, which is, 
in the first place, about the First War. 
This most relevant explanation of the intrinsic value of the friendship for its own 
sake is expressed in various ways. Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, however, coined 
the classic expression on the matter, which remains a standard Franco-German quote. In 
their Common Declaration at the beginning of the Franco-German Treaty in 1963, the two 
statesmen speak about terminating “a centuries-old rivalry.”36 Many have employed the 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Quoted in Delattre 1997. 
34 Jünger 1978 (1921); Jünger 1980 (1922). 
35 Scholl-Latour 1988, 127. 
36 For the quotes and the entire declaration, see Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut 
Ludwigsburg 1993, 136-137. See also Kageneck 1994. 
formulation since.37 Overcoming a centuries-old rivalry, a history of anguish and suffering, 
of beating each other to death, is a shared social purpose. It is an important element 
contributing to the institutionalized Franco-German meaning. 
 
The Occident’s Two Wings. A second justification of the Franco-German bond as valuable in 
itself relates to French and German cultural heritage. This explanation rests on the idea that 
France and Germany belong together or have much to give to each other, as cultures, as 
ways of life, in their shared but also different historical experiences; that separating them is 
artificial; or that together they form the kernel of Western culture or civilization (or a 
combination of these elements). “France and Germany,” Victor Hugo formulated already in 
1841, “are essentially Europe. Germany is its heart; France is its head. … Germany feels, 
France thinks.”38  Although such ideas have been around for some time, during the past four 
decades this explanation has become a standard platform that has been directly related to the 
public relations between France and Germany.39 This explanation refers to a Western 
cultural heritage, which “they communally own and have to jointly preserve.”40 
Although evoked less frequently than the first, this justification is strong particularly 
because it is little contested across the spectrum of political orientations and because it refers 
to a diverse range of cultural domains. French and Germans of the right, center, and left 
frequently make similar cases for this explanation of Franco-German togetherness: from the 
German zealots of existentialism in the 1950s and 1960s; to French perceptions of the 
variants of the Frankfurt School in all its adaptations; to postmodern tempests with their 
origins under French skies; to the Ernst Jünger admirers in France, his German followers 
and their exchanges across the Rhine. 
This explanation again comes in diverse variations. Novelist Marcel Jouhandeau 
reports one stark manifestation. In his Journal Sous l’Occupation he recounts a dinner he 
                                                 
37 President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, for example, alluded to it during the celebrations of the 25th anni-
versary of the Elysée Treaty. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 January 1988, 1-2. 
38 Quoted in Große 1996, 327. 
39 The Hugo passage, as well as other formulations expressing what I subsume in this section, may leave some 
readers with an aftertaste of French, German, Franco-German (cultural or intellectual) self-centeredness and 
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40 Herre 1983, 10. De Gaulle and Adenauer alluded to this normative anchor in their Common Declaration to 
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nects them in their cultural development.” Printed in Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches 
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attended with Jean Giraudoux and Jünger during the German occupation of Paris: 
“Giraudoux does not hide that for him the pivots of civilization are France and Germany. If 
they are saved together, everything is saved; but we must seriously fear for the future should 
humanity fall under American or Russian domination.”41 Literature Nobel laureate Romain 
Rolland formulates it differently: “We are the two wings of the occident; if one breaks, the 
flight of the other will cease.”42 
 
Two for Europe. The third main explanation of Franco-German relations I term “two for 
Europe.” The conventional wisdom is almost a cliché: within the framework of the EC/EU, 
“nothing goes without, nothing against Germany and France”—that while “France and 
Germany finding a common position might not be a sufficient condition ‘for Europe,’ it is a 
necessary one.” The explanation is clear: relations between France and Germany are 
valuable, as there can be no progress in either deepening, widening, or even consolidating 
the achievements of European integration – however loosely defined – without basic 
agreements on fundamental positions between the two big continentals: “the Franco-
German entente as the cradle of European integration.”43  In this third justification another 
end, “Europe,” helps to explain the intrinsic value of the Franco-German bond. 
One may counter that if Franco-German relations are an inherent good because they 
serve “Europe,” however loosely defined, they are a means, not an end on their own. 
This would be a correct interdiction, if between the defined necessity “good Franco-
German relationship” and “Europe” were a tight coupling on a case-by-case basis. But 
nothing could be further from the actual state of things. The goal of a “good Franco-
German relationship” is in daily Franco-German dealings so loosely coupled or 
altogether decoupled from specific identifiable European projects, that this “ex-
planation” in fact contributes to constructing Franco-German relations as an 
independent value in itself. 
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pop music were in the process of being negotiated, there were frequent references to the “flat and aggressive 
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42 Quoted in Herre 1983, 206. 
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III. Where It Comes From and How It Came About 
In a string of frequently moving gestures, rituals, ceremonies, and speeches between their 
publicly private first meeting in September 1958 and their fraternal kiss after signing the 
Franco-German Treaty in 1963, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer initially generated 
and instituted new and radically different Franco-German meaning and purpose. Together, 
these grand meaning-generating gestures contributed to a momentous transformation of the 
meaning inherent in the relationship between France and Germany. They constitute the 
overtures of an incipient era with France and Germany considered a “tandem,” “couple,” 
and “pair.” 
After “centuries of rivalry,” some eighty years of “hereditary enmity” between 1870 
and 1945, and roughly fifteen years of “reconciliation” (réconciliation, Aussöhnung) following 
the end of World War II, the symbolic acts of 1958-1963 contributed to the social 
construction of an entirely new Franco-German reality. During these years “the two old 
occidentals” 44 laid the groundwork for a transmuted Franco-German structure of value, 
meaning, and purpose.45  “Through us,” de Gaulle writes about his meetings with  Adenauer 
beginning in 1958, “the relations between France and Germany will establish themselves on 
a basis and in an atmosphere unknown in their history.”46 
Just as historical reasons have been put forth to justify the enmity between France 
and Germany before 1945, de Gaulle and Adenauer’s symbolic acts are at the root of a 
historical explanation of Franco-German rapprochement and then friendship.47  “With the 
demonstrative gestures and speeches during Adenauer’s state visit in France in July 1962 and 
de Gaulle’s return visit two months later,” historian Wilfried Loth evaluates, “the French 
president made sure that the reconciliation between Germans and French became deeply 
anchored in the cognizance of both peoples.”48  Political scientist Gerhard Kiersch asserts 
that de Gaulle and Adenauer’s gestures “are about historical memories, symbolic actions, 
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46 de Gaulle 1970b, 192. 
47 Aron 1965, 3. 
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and emotions that are mirrored in collective identity.”49  It is the symbolic acts of 1958-1963 
that form the kernel of the “communal foundational myths” about which Le Monde 
commentator Lucas Delattre writes some four decades later. 50 
The Significance of a Family Home: Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises (September 
1958) 
The seeds for the new institutional time were planted at the first meeting between de Gaulle 
and Adenauer in September 1958, the year de Gaulle returned to power. The chancellor 
prepared for the meeting with de Gaulle with unease. He expected the General to be difficult 
to approach, militarist, and anti-German.51  Adenauer was “full of great worry about de 
Gaulle’s way of thinking,” and anxious about the personality he would encounter.52  The 
statesmen met on 14 and 15 September 1958 at de Gaulle’s private home La Boisserie, a 
country house within a stone-wall fortified park in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises – a tiny 
village in the southeastern corner of the Champagne halfway between Paris and the Rhine. 
Adenauer’s worries were not well founded: the two leaders instantly respected and 
liked each other. The small circle of ministers and advisors present before and after their 
private meeting noted their quickly developing and deepening mutual appreciation.53  The 
gathering marked the beginning of a lasting friendship between them, and signaled the 
opening of a new historical period between France and Germany. Adenauer was the first and 
only foreign statesman to be received in the General’s private domicile54 – not standard 
practice in international politics, let alone between the highest representatives of states 
looking back on a recent vicious history of “hereditary enmity.” In addition, he was honored 
by being invited to stay overnight.55 
The grand old conservative de Gaulle, deeply molded into thinking of politics – and 
social life at large – in symbolic terms, was fully aware of the significance accorded to his 
publicly private invitation: “Because it seemed to me,” he writes some ten years later, “that it 
would be appropriate to give the encounter an exceptional mark, and that, for the historical 
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53 See, for example, the notes of then French ambassador to Germany Seydoux 1975, 209-234. 
54 Scholl-Latour 1988, 58. 
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explication between this old Frenchman and this very old German in the name of their two 
peoples, the surroundings of a family home has more significance than the setting of a palace 
would have. My wife and I, thus, offer the chancellor the modest honors of the Boisserie.”56 
De Gaulle further reports that between their groundbreaking first encounter in 
Colombey and the middle of 1962, he and the chancellor wrote each other about forty times, 
met fifteen times (most often in Paris, Marly, Rambouillet, Baden-Baden, and Bonn), and 
spent altogether some one hundred hours talking to each other – either by themselves, in the 
presence of their ministers, or in the company of their families.57  The ostentatious cordiality 
between the two gave an extra edge to the growing ties between chancellor and president. It 
reinforced and intensified the sense that relations between France and Germany could be 
based on a fundamentally different historical footing from the one the two old politicians 
knew only too well. With more than thirty-five years of temporal distance, political analyst 
Maurice Vaïsse concludes that the “affectionate and very strong connection” that was 
created in Colombey would be turned into cement for the Franco-German entente.58 How-
ever, the social meaning of the value, importance, and beauty of the Franco-German 
friendship, and of the normative desirability of Franco-German bondedness, would become 
even more pronounced and would attain truly dramatic heights in the years to come. 
Parading, Kneeling, Uniting the Prayers: Adenauer in France (July 1962) 
Mourmelon, 8 July 1962. In July 1962, Chancellor Adenauer accepted de Gaulle’s invitation for 
an official visit to France. De Gaulle accompanied him along much of the way. The 
symbolism and meaning-creating effects of two way-stops are elemental. The first was the 
joint parade of French and German soldiers on a military training ground in the Champagne. 
“For the first time in history, French and German troops paraded jointly in front of 
representatives of their states” – “a visible expression of the conclusive overcoming of the 
military enmity between the two countries.”59  “At the camp at Mourmelon,” Ambassador 
François Seydoux describes the scene, “the troops of the two countries were lined up side by 
side, thus showing, in contrast to the combats of the past, the image of their new 
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fraternity.”60 
 
The Te Deum of Reims, 8 July 1962. The last stop of the trip led de Gaulle and Adenauer to 
Reims in northern Champagne, a city rich with historical memory and symbols: a 
“demonstration of commonality in front of a historical scenery of occidental culture, a 
grandiose finale to a remarkable state visit.”61  It culminated in the joint celebration of a Te 
Deum in its imposing thirteenth century cathedral with president and chancellor, both 
practicing Catholics, kneeling and praying next to each other. 
Reims had been the location of many events that are accorded great import in 
French national and Franco-German historiography: In Reims around the year 498, Clovis – 
as the legend has it, under the pressure of his wife Clothilde – was baptized together with 
some hundreds or thousands of his followers by bishop Remigius (Rémi), an event which 
still leads many to consider France the Catholic church’s eldest daughter, la fille aînée de l’église. 
From the Capetians in the 10th century until the 19th century, almost all French kings were 
crowned in Reims.62  During the First World War German fire destroyed its majestic 
cathedral, one of the most magnificent achievements of gothic architecture. For four years 
the trenches cut through the land just outside the city. By the end of the First World War the 
city had been almost entirely destroyed. This war left some 8,000 of its formerly more than 
100,000 citizens scattered and hiding in the subterranean wine caves hammered into the 
Champagne’s chalky soil. And another war later, on 7 May 1945 in the headquarters of the 
allied forces, in a brick stone building that today houses a high school with the name Lycée 
Roosevelt, German General Jodl handed over the unconditional surrender of what the national 
socialists called the “Greater German Empire.”63 
For all the significance that Reims holds for French national history, it has also been 
a long-time crossroads for exchanges between what became France and Germany, and 
where French and Germans fought for a thousand years. Here, the two leaders jointly sought 
rapprochement with the help of religion for a new, different (institutional) future (of 
meaning) in the middle of a huge battlefield, by together celebrating a mass, kneeling next to 
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each other, and “uniting their prayers.” Especially with this gesture, they also turned the city 
into a symbol of the new Franco-German meaning for a new era “founded on union and 
brotherhood … the diffusion point of another Franco-German message consisting of 
conciliation and peace.”64 
Again, the two statesmen were aware of the deep symbolic meaning of the scene: 
“The trip finishes in Reims,” de Gaulle reveals, “symbol of our ancient traditions, but also 
arena of numerous confrontations of the hereditary enemies from the ancient Germanic 
invasions to the battles at the Marne. At the cathedral, the wounds of which are not yet 
entirely healed, the premier French and the premier German unite their prayers that from 
the two sides of the Rhine the works of friendship may forever replace the miseries of 
war.”65 
Indeed, if one delegated the task of finding collective identity-creating measures to a 
consulting firm, it could propose no better scenario than having the two most powerful men 
in the highest offices of their countries kneeling next to each other, “uniting their prayers,” 
demonstratively proclaiming by communally celebrating a Te Deum: Look, our citizens and 
look, rest of the world, we have the same god, we have the same heaven. We are close and 
we should move closer together in this world too, overcoming the hell that we have 
produced and put each other through in the past by giving each other a promise for the 
future. 
The Triumph of Franco-German Friendship: de Gaulle in Germany 
(September 1962) 
De Gaulle returned the chancellor’s “unforgettable voyage”66 some two months later 
between 4 and 9 September. The triumphal trip led the president from Bonn and Cologne 
through Düsseldorf and Duisburg to Hamburg and Munich, culminating in Ludwigsburg. 
Kiersch declares it the most important visit of a foreign statesman to Germany after 1945: an 
“identity-generating state visit.”67 Greeted enthusiastically wherever he appeared during this 
trip full of “demonstrative gestures and speeches,”68 de Gaulle purposefully attempted to 
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approach the panoply of German society. He addressed speeches to the German political 
class, German workers, the German army leadership, and finally the German youth from the 
yard of Ludwigsburg’s baroque castle.69 
The extraordinary value of the reconciliation, friendship, and bonding between 
France and Germany is the Leitmotiv of de Gaulle’s speeches and gestures. It is the essence of 
the statesman’s entire journey. Beginning with the welcome reception in his honor at the 
castle Brühl, he emphasized that “the rapprochement in friendship of our two countries is 
without question one of the most important and brilliant events of all those that Europe and 
the world have seen in the course of centuries.”70 
This motive had come up often before and was to re-appear after this trip to 
Germany. However, de Gaulle pushed it to a boiling culmination in his speech to the 
workers at the Thyssen steel factory in Duisburg-Hamborn. Symbolic for its location in the 
heart of the Ruhr area, this long-time leading arms producer represented German militarism. 
As he had done before and would do again, de Gaulle addressed his German audience with a 
speech entirely in German. After declaring that what “is produced on the Ruhr and in these 
factories, today evokes only comfort and satisfaction in my country,” de Gaulle exclaimed, 
only to be interrupted by the ebullient ovations of his listeners: “I ask all of you to join in 
and to celebrate, together with me, a new event, the greatest of our modern era, the 
friendship between Germany and France.”71 
De Gaulle gave his last speech of this voyage through Germany in Ludwigsburg on 9 
September 1962. Addressed to the German youth, it concluded a trip which the general had 
turned into a triumph for the new institutional meaning of an incipient social era between 
France and Germany. This sermon remains one of the most affecting addresses that a 
foreigner has directed to Germans after the physical destruction and moral devastation of 
World War II and Holocaust. 
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“I congratulate all of you!” the president began by proclaiming; “I first congratulate 
you for being young,” he continued, and went on to speak about mastering life and about 
the promises of the future.72  Then, de Gaulle returned to the theme a second time with a 
variation: “I further congratulate you for being young Germans, which means children of a 
great people.” The audience was puzzled. The younger ones had never heard anything like it. 
And the older ones probably could not help but experience a flashback to other times that 
they had suppressed for the last seventeen years. De Gaulle’s pause after this sentence still 
appears long. And it still appears to be filled with amazement and sorrow by an audience that 
did not know how to feel or how to react to such formulations. De Gaulle repeated: “Yes! of 
a great people! that sometimes, in the course of its history, has committed great mistakes and 
that has caused much condemnable misery.” He then talked about German contributions to 
science, art, and philosophy, concluding the paragraph with the exclamation that “the French 
people knows to fully appreciate all this, as it too knows what it means … to give and to suf-
fer.” Finally, de Gaulle came back to his opening theme yet a third time: “Finally, I 
congratulate you for being today’s youth. At the moment when you enter professional life, a 
new life for humankind will begin” – closing this introductory part with a reflection on 
mastering material progresses and the possibility for humans to become “freer, more 
dignified, and better.” 
Concluding his speech, de Gaulle related everything mentioned during his address to 
the relations between French and Germans and France and Germany. Simultaneously, he 
condensed the substance of his entire state visit, stressing that “this solidarity, now entirely 
natural, of course needs to be organized. This is the task of governments. Most of all, 
however, we need to give it viable content. And that shall be in particular the task of the 
youth.” De Gaulle finished this second-to-last paragraph by calling upon his listeners: “… it 
is up to you and the French youth, to get all groups from you and from us, to get closer and 
closer to each other, to get to know each other better, and to knit tighter bonds.” Finally, he 
summed up with the crescendo that he had mastered so well and that led his listeners to 
ovations: “The future of our two countries, the foundation stone on which Europe’s unity 
can and must be erected, and the highest trump for the freedom of the world, remains the 
mutual respect, the trust, and the friendship between the French and the German people.” 
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Why Then? 
Why did the transformation of meaning for a new institutional time take place between 1958 
and 1963, and not earlier or later; why in the aftermath of World War II, but not after World 
War I or after the 1870/71 war? Why did it take place at all? The more general aspects of 
these questions are of an imposing magnitude. They concern the emergence and 
transformation of social meaning and purpose in the international sphere. Generally 
answering them would lead toward a theory of international social facts, and of the 
emergence, transformation, and potential decay of social meaning and purpose as 
institutionalized in the international sphere. 
However, the case at hand suggests that the deep transformation of meaning then 
required the combination of at least three necessary conditions. Their co-presence might be 
coincidental. The first seemed to be a widely shared sense of rupture, and a perceived need 
for a break with the past. Three wars in less than eighty years, culminating in the moral as 
much as material catastrophes of the Second World War (and the Holocaust on the German 
side) constituted exactly that.73  Perhaps the rupture was even so deep that it signified an end 
to a historical period of almost five hundred years in which Western Europe had self-
confidently and as a matter of course viewed itself as the center of the world. With American 
troops from the west and south and Soviet troops from the east overrunning the continent, 
such political-cultural imaginations were no longer viable. “After 1945 all people on the 
continent had been defeated. … On the debris a new world took shape.”74  The sense of his-
torical rupture after 1945 was fundamental. 
The availability of personalities with the charisma and the moral caliber to credibly 
execute the generation and initial installation of new social meaning and purpose appeared a 
second necessary condition. Major historical breaches, both in their symbolic and political-
administrative business-like aspects, require the proper personnel. De Gaulle and Adenauer 
were such figures. 
The presence of an appropriate social turf, apparently indispensably including elites 
as much as larger publics, that allowed the seeds for a new social time with a new meaning to 
grow, seemed a third necessary requirement. In post-1945 France, for example, historian 
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Reinhart Koselleck perceptively notes, not “the Germans,” but the Nazi terror-regime, had 
been defined as France’s World War II enemy.75 
 
IV. Reproduction, Perpetuation, Corroboration 
Social structures exist in processes. Patterns of interaction and meaning, they require 
reproduction and perpetuation or risk withering away and disappearing. The Franco-German 
meaning initially generated in the late 1950s and early 1960s did not wither away. A host of 
symbolic practices have reproduced and perpetuated, corroborated and extended it. Some of 
these practices are more or less regularized and recurrent. Others, single events, are 
meaningful as integral parts of the overall fabric.76 
Treaty Anniversaries and Other Marks in the Calendar 
Among the recurrent Franco-German symbolic practices are the celebrations of the Elysée 
Treaty and other bilateral achievements. They follow a rather orderly schedule. Their dates 
are marked on the calendar. After a more general discussion of treaty anniversaries, I will 
take a closer look at the 20th and 25th Treaty anniversaries in 1983 and 1988 respectively. 
 
Treaty Anniversaries as Franco-German Holidays. Elysée Treaty anniversaries, one element re-
creating Franco-German meaning, are on the yearly calendar of events. However, especially 
on the “round numbers,” such as the Treaty’s tenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth anniversaries 
(and so forth), there is a large variety of commemorative Treaty activities. In addition to 
official celebrations honoring the value and importance of Franco-German cooperation and 
friendship, a diverse range of publications accompany these occasions, observing the 
bilateral relationship and recalling the value of Franco-German accomplishment. 
Many of these writings – three types in particular – focus on critically examining this 
relationship’s history and present state. First, the leading newspapers and magazines review 
the relationship’s recent results, analyzing failures and disappointments and reviewing 
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76 The bulk of material that could be listed demands discipline in presentation. I attempt to give a representa-
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achievements. They frequently publish special sections or entire special issues dealing with 
various aspects of Franco-German matters.77  Second, there are publications in academic or 
semi-academic journals that focus on Franco-German affairs and reflect upon historical and 
political matters with greater distance.78 Third, the public or semi-public units of the Franco-
German interaction network themselves, as well as French and German governmental 
entities, submit various types of publications that review certain aspects of the bilateral 
relationship.79  It has already become a tradition for the French and German coordinators 
for Franco-German affairs to publish thorough reviews of all domains of Franco-German 
affairs and make suggestions for the future.80 
What unites most of these diverse publications is a generally implicit normative 
orientation, a tacitly assumed value frame, that presents Franco-German cooperation as a 
value, a “good,” a precious achievement on its own that deserves care and nurturing. 
They criticize and regret failures, whereby the scope of “failure” and “disappointment” is 
wide, and the level of expectations typically high. They praise successes and 
achievements (read: functioning interaction; “products-outcomes-results”), although not 
as ardently as they lament failures. And they frequently suggest potential future Franco-
                                                 
77 For example, at the 25th anniversary, the biweekly review of the German press in French La Tribune d’Alle-
magne published a special with articles from twenty-five years of life with the “friendship treaty”’; see La Tribune 
d'Allemagne 1988. 
78 See, for example, the book edited by Jacques Delors at the 35th anniversary of the Treaty. Delors 1998b. 
79 For the 25th anniversary, for example, the German defense ministry published a substantive volume entitled 
“Franco-German Cooperation. 25 Years Elysée Treaty.” The cover of the book shows the French rooster and 
the German eagle happily arm in arm. Contributors to the volume included many who had been intimately in-
volved in Franco-German affairs. The book’s front page displays a Carl Zuckmayer quote: “As it was our duty 
yesterday to be enemies, today it is our right to become brothers.” I cite the quote as indicative of the norma-
tive charge of such publications, irrespective of its historical and moral accuracy. Bundesministerium der Ver-
teidigung (German Ministry of Defense) 1988. For the 30th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, the secretariat of 
the Franco-German Defense and Security Council published a historically oriented volume evaluating thirty 
years of Franco-German cooperation in defense and security. Secrétariat du Conseil Franco-Allemand de Dé-
fense et de Sécurité/Sekretariat des Deutsch-Französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrates 1993. For de-
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the other country. 
German projects or directions. All this is part of a social structure of meaning, at once 
expressing, perpetuating, and corroborating it. 
 
Mitterrand in the Bundestag: The 20th Anniversary (January 1983). French President François 
Mitterrand came to Bonn on 20 January 1983 in order to venerate the 20th anniversary of the 
signing of the Elysée Treaty with a speech before the German Bundestag. The scheduling of 
the address was meant as a sign of special honor for the French president. More uncommon 
is that a speech on such an occasion – which would typically focus on uncontroversial or 
self-congratulatory matters – would address a hotly debated political issue. And this is exactly 
what Mitterrand did. The lion’s share of his speech was about the politically most 
controversial issue in Germany in the early 1980s: NATO’s two-track decision and the 
resulting stationing of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles (Pershing II) on 
German soil. And Mitterrand took a very clear position on the matter, arguing decidedly in 
favor of the stationing. 
The decision to do so was daring, not just because he knew only too well that close 
to half of the German parliamentarians (notably those of his PS’s sister party SPD) had great 
difficulty with the position for which he so determinedly argued.81  Mitterrand’s decision 
rested on a self-assured cognizance of the stability of Franco-German ties, a necessary 
condition for this kind of political debate across borders. One simply does not do such 
things without confidence in a relationship, its intimacy, and the unlikelihood of potential 
misunderstanding. This, too, is how the speech was understood. 
One needs to consider what did not happen after Mitterrand’s speech: those 
Germans who disagreed with Mitterrand, including the German parliamentarians, did not 
chastise the French president for involving himself in another state’s internal affairs. They 
might very well have criticized the speech and its orator on such grounds. Instead they 
basically admitted the French president’s legitimacy to intervene (even so forcefully) in what 
really was a German domestic issue of Meinungs- or Willensbildung (position- or will-building) 
– “no chief of state of another country could have permitted himself to take sides so openly, 
without a sharp rebuke.”82 
However, Mitterrand turned this speech into a Franco-German symbol for still 
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another reason. He did not emphasize what France wanted, the French position, French 
interests. Instead, he approached the entire debate in an exclusively argumentative way 
without acknowledging the differences in perspective that might arise depending on one’s 
side of the Rhine. He treated the entire missile debate as an internal, amalgamated Franco-
German subject – no “we” (French) and “you” (Germans) in his key arguments, but only 
“us” (Frenchmen and Germans), expressing rudiments of collective identity. The “speech 
makes evident that for each of us security is a shared concern,” Delors comments.83  
Mitterrand’s speech became a milestone of Franco-German intimacy, with the top public 
functionary of one country taking a strong position in a highly contested domestic political 
issue of the other.84 A day later, on 21 January 1983, Chancellor Kohl visited Paris, honoring 
the Treaty there as the kernel of Franco-German reconciliation.85 
 
Celebrated in Style: The 25th Anniversary (January 1988). 22 January 1988, the Elysée Treaty’s 
twenty-fifth anniversary, was turned into a true Franco-German holiday. The celebrations of 
the 25th anniversary self-confidently demonstrated a Franco-German normality of proximity 
and belonging. The Treaty was “celebrated in style.”86 
The official celebrations began with a troop parade in the yard of the Dôme des 
Invalides, where in the presence of the French and German delegations the French 
Republican guard played the German national anthem (Le Figaro: “more majestic than one is 
used to in Germany”), and a German military music group the Marseillaise (L’Humanité: 
“intoning the French anthem already in Bavarian style”). After the regular working sessions 
of the parallel 51st Franco-German summit consultations, a short commemorative 
celebration followed in the Elysée Palace’s salon Murat, where the Treaty had been concluded 
a quarter century earlier. There, Kohl and Mitterrand signed – in the presence of Maurice 
Couve de Murville, as de Gaulle’s foreign minister one of the Treaty’s signatories – the 
protocols on the creation of a Franco-German Defense and Security Council and a Franco-
German Financial and Economic Council, amending the 1963 Treaty. 
                                                                                                                                                 
82 Friend 1991, 70. 
83 Delors 1998c, 3. On the same issue, Delors does not hesitate to add that for France, among others, that 
means “a change in the conception of its ‘sanctuaire nucléaire.’” Ibid. 
84 Another such instance is Chancellor Kohl’s forceful intervention supporting the political forces in France 
promoting the “yes” in the political campaign in France before the referendum on the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU). See Delors 1998c. 
85 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 74. 
Subsequently, the German chancellor and the French president retreated for one 
hour of private discussion. In the early afternoon, Chancellor Kohl drove over to the Hôtel 
Matignon, where he spoke for one hour with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. Chancellor and 
president then jointly visited French and German high school students at the Goethe 
Gymnasium and the Lycée Henri IV. The festivities continued with an official reception 
back at the Elysée palace, where the French president had invited some five hundred guests 
who “had rendered outstanding services to Franco-German cooperation.”87  They included 
the 1963 signatories, Foreign Ministers de Murville and Gerhard Schröder; ninety-two year 
old Ernst Jünger, recipient of the Pour le mérite medal of the First World War, was invited 
according to Mitterrand’s personal wishes.88  A concert by French and German choirs in the 
church Saint-Louis des Invalides, organized by the Franco-German Youth Office, again with 
numerous Franco-German honoraries present, concluded this anniversary. Stamps of both 
the French and the German public mail services commemorate the occasion.89 
First Things First: The Tradition of “Symbolic Firsts” 
Another set of recurrent symbolic practices that re-creates Franco-German meaning are the 
various kinds of “symbolic firsts.” 
 
Federal Chancellors and Presidents of the Republic. Over the past three decades, it has become a 
symbolic tradition that the first trip abroad of new German chancellors and French 
presidents will be taken to the respective other country very shortly after having taken the 
position. Alternatively, the first visitor that is received in the new office will be from the new 
colleague across the Rhine. Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing came to office at 
almost the same time in May 1974. President d’Estaing invited Chancellor Schmidt in a 
telephone call on the very day when he took office –  “a form of invitation that is more than 
                                                                                                                                                 
86 DePorte 1991, 267. 
87 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 January 1988, 1. 
88 See de Bresson 1988, 4-5; Scholl-Latour 1988, 517-523. 
89 de Bresson 1988. In addition to the predominantly symbolic practices and the signing of the protocols to the 
Treaty installing a Franco-German Defense and Security Council as well as a Finance and Economic Council, 
22 January 1988 saw the exchange of notes on the creation of a Franco-German Cultural Council, the ultimate 
decision to install a mixed and integrated Franco-German brigade, an exchange of notes on the foundation of a 
“de Gaulle-Adenauer prize” to honor special achievement regarding Franco-German cooperation, a common 
declaration on the coordination of German and French development aid in Africa, the confirmation of the 
foundation of a Franco-German university college, and the inauguration of two translation prizes (one for each 
language) in order to support the spread of each country’s literature in the respective other country. See Presse- 
unusual for the diplomatic protocol.”90  And the two met shortly thereafter. “It was for both 
of us the first talk in the new office that we led with a foreign head of government: Giscard 
received his first foreign visitor,” Schmidt records in his memoirs, “and I myself made my 
first visit abroad. The instantaneous gathering came as a surprise for Europe’s public 
opinion, although it was presently recognized as a matter of course.”91 
The same proceeding took place seven years later in 1981, after Mitterrand had 
defeated Giscard in the presidential election and succeeded him as President of the Republic: 
“The new President François Mitterrand took office on 21 May; three days later, I was his 
first foreign visitor.”92 
Again a year and a half later, in an attempt to break the record, Schmidt’s successor 
Helmut Kohl traveled to Paris on 4 October 1982, three days after having been elected 
chancellor, a day after having sworn his oath93 – “a blitzvisit to Paris in order to stress the 
continuity of the tight German-French relations.”94 Note that the next regular summit 
consultations had already been scheduled for 21-22 October. In other words, the new 
chancellor would have met the French president shortly thereafter as part of the regular 
Franco-German consultations. But for Franco-German standards, soon was not soon 
enough. “It was meant as a drum beat and that is how it was perceived. … Still faster was 
impossible.”95 
When, sixteen years later, Social-Democratic contender Gerhard Schröder defeated 
Kohl in the federal elections, Schröder traveled to Paris three days after the election – before 
taking office.96 “Indeed, from the Franco-German perspective Schröder’s start went almost 
according to the ritual.”97 
 
Ministers, Federal Presidents, and Other Firsts. The “first things first” ritual extends well beyond 
chancellors and French presidents. When the eighteen-year German Foreign minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher resigned on 18 May 1992, his successor Klaus Kinkel met his French 
                                                                                                                                                 
und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Bulletin) 1988, 82-88. 
90 Ecker-Ertle 1998, 125. 
91 Schmidt 1990, 168. 
92 Ibid., 241. 
93 Becker 1983. 
94 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 71. 
95 Ziebura 1997, 328. 
96 See Woyke 2000, 173. 
97 Altwegg 1998. 
counterpart Roland Dumas and French prime minister Pierre Bérégovoy on the very same 
day, just after his appointment.98 This meeting was entirely independent from the next 
summit consultations in La Rochelle, scheduled to take place only three days later on 21-22 
May 1992. Six years later, the new German foreign minister Joschka Fischer met his French 
counterpart Hubert Védrine on 28 October 1998, a few hours after having taken over his 
new position.99 
The “first visit” tradition also extends to German presidents. For example, Richard 
von Weizsäcker’s first trip abroad after Germany’s 1990-unification was to France.100  
Johannes Rau’s first official trip abroad as German president brought him to Paris on 27 July 
1999, soon after his inauguration. A number of other practices complement this Franco-
German “symbolic firsts” tradition. President Jacques Chirac, for example, was the first 
foreign statesman to speak in front of the German parliament after it moved to the 
Reichstag in Berlin. Chirac acknowledged the symbolic first in his speech, stating that he felt 
“deeply touched” to be the first foreign head of state “to address all of Germany from this 
spot. … Thank you for this moment which neither I myself, nor my fellow citizens will 
forget.”101 
Single Events and Overall Fabric 
In addition to more or less regularly recurrent symbolic practices, a range of singular 
symbolic acts have contributed to perpetuating and corroborating Franco-German meaning. 
Considered isolated occurrences, “single events” remain underappreciated. Understanding 
them as types of a category allows us to adequately appreciate their significance for the 
overall fabric. They are not merely a series of separate, dissociated events. Viewed as a 
constitutive part of a normalcy that is taken for granted, some of them might be noted only 
in passing. Others, seemingly carrying the mark of the (at least somewhat) extraordinary, 
receive considerable media attention. 
                                                 
98 See Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 114. 
99 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 October 1998, 1. Fischer’s first real working sessions with Védrine, as was 
demonstratively made public in Bonn and Paris, included discussions that lasted for more than five hours and 
covered all foreign policy issues. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 November 1998, 9. 
100 Pariser Kurier 40 May/June 1991. 
101 Referring to a speech de Gaulle gave in Germany stating that “our rapprochement, then our union are 
among the most striking events of the entire history,” Chirac places himself into the tradition of meaning that 
the General initially installed, and reproduces it. All quotes are from the speech delivered on 27 June 2000. Le 
Monde, 28 June 2000, 16-17; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 June 2000, 10-11. 
 Laying a Foundation Stone in Berlin (July 1998). In July 1998, German and French German 
foreign ministers Kinkel and Védrine gathered at the Pariser Platz in Berlin to together “set 
the first stone (Grundsteinlegung)” of the new construction of France’s future embassy at the 
Brandenburg gate and in view of the new governmental district around the Reichstag. 102  In 
the course of the German government’s move to Berlin, the French embassy also had to be 
transferred. Located on the strip of no-man’s-land that had cut through the divided Berlin 
from 1961 on, the old French embassy building had been destroyed. After 1990, France and 
Germany agreed to build a new French embassy at the distinguished former location. With 
the two ministers’ joint laying of the foundation stone the construction began.103 
 
German Soldiers on the Champs-Elysées (July 1994). Already at the 63rd Franco-German 
consultations of May 1994 in Mulhouse/Alsace, Mitterrand announced that he had invited 
German soldiers to parade together with French troops in celebration of France’s national 
holiday.104 On 14 July 1994, French and German soldiers of the Franco-German 
Brigade/Eurocorps jointly paraded on the Champs-Elysées.105  The French soldiers were in 
French uniforms, the German soldiers in German uniforms; they were united by the same 
beret that indicated their common belonging to the Eurocorps. Fifty years after the 
liberation of Paris, German uniformed soldiers had returned to France’s capital. But the 
meaning of their presence was radically transformed. Now, they came together with their 
French brothers in arms and belonged to the same military unit. When the troops paraded 
by their political leaders on that day, the scene became a self-confident demonstration of 
Franco-German belonging and intimacy, as much as one commemorating the storming of 
the Bastille.106 
                                                 
102 For example, Die Welt, 11-12 July 1998, 2. 
103 After the symbolic act, the two ministers took the opportunity to emphasize that “nothing could replace the 
very tight relations between France and Germany.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 July 1998, 4. 
104 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 125. 
105 Also, it has been pointed out that on that day the squadron that sprayed the blue-white-red color during the 
parade consisted of Alpha Jets, a Franco-German military aircraft cooperation of the late 1960s and 1970s. See 
Bittner 1986, 118-119; Couapel 1994. 
106 This is a prime example of what Max Weber has in mind with his important insistence on the element of 
meaning (Sinngehalt or Sinnhaftigkeit) in social relations or what John Searle stresses in pointing at an ontology 
that is inadequately described in physical-chemical terms on the surface level of brute facts. Especially clearly, 
see Weber 1972 (1921), 13-14. Searle 1995, very basically on 2-3. Searle might emphasize that one could de-
scribe the scene as a group of men walking down a street in an orderly and organized fashion, wearing a stan-
dardized type of clothing, while a certain type of music is being played. Intersubjectively shared knowledge tells 
Schmidt and Giscard at Charlemagne’s Throne (September 1978). In the course of the 32nd Franco-
German summit consultation, on 14 September 1978 Chancellor Schmidt and President 
Giscard d’Estaing jointly attended a concert in Aachen’s cathedral. At the throne and grave 
of Charlemagne, whom “we Frenchmen know as a Frank, and whom you consider a 
German Kaiser,”107  Giscard evoked “Charlemagne’s spirit”108  “for the strengthening of the 
good understanding between the Federal Republic of Germany and France.”109 And 
Schmidt, at this “symbolic soil for such a Franco-German encounter” tied to the 
“remembrance of the joint historic origins of both the French and German nations,”110 
toasted “the peace among French and Germans and the friendship and cooperation among 
our two peoples”: 111  “The most important form of coming to terms with the past is to 
master the presence and to prepare for a good future. On this joint insight, … perhaps even 
joint experience, rests our [Franco-German] friendship. … indeed since Robert Schuman, 
since Adenauer, since de Gaulle a tradition has grown, which for our two peoples … and 
Europe as a whole is of high value. We should endeavor to augment this tradition and 
subsequently pass it on as a binding heritage to those who come after us.”112  Observers 
noticed the Aachen meeting’s association with prior Franco-German gestures, reminiscing 
particularly about the great scene with de Gaulle and Adenauer after two world wars in 
Reims’s cathedral:113 “A touch of Reims at Charlemagne’s throne.”114 
 
The Adhesive Force of Joint Memory: Hand in Hand in Verdun (September 1984). On 22 September 
1984, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl gathered in Verdun, site of the most 
gruesome slaughtering of the First World War, where between February and December 1916 
some 700,000 French and Germans had lost their lives. Mitterrand had previously declared 
                                                                                                                                                 
us that what we are dealing with is a military parade. Knowledge of uniforms and other symbols tell us that 
what we see are French and German soldiers. But the point is that to really grasp the decisive features of what 
is happening here and to understand European international political organization, this is still is not enough. In 
order to understand the stage on which much of European international politics takes place, it is essential to 
know about the difference in meaning that such practices convey, between, say, 1940 and 1994 – instead of 
treating the events as brute facts “taking place as such.” 
107 Giscard d'Estaing 1978a, 950. 
108 Giscard d'Estaing 1978b, 953. 
109 Giscard d'Estaing 1978a, 951. 
110 Schmidt 1978, 949. 
111 Ibid., 950. 
112 Ibid., 949. 
113 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 September 1978, 10. 
114 So titles the same paper a historical reflection on Franco-German affairs at the occasion. Winandy 1978. 
in a press conference that he intended to meet the chancellor in Verdun for a ceremony in 
which he and Kohl would “demonstrate in an unshakable fashion that on the basis of the 
Franco-German friendship, on which much depends, we would be committed for the 
future.”115 
President and chancellor convened there in order to honor the dead German and 
French soldiers of both world wars, and to publicly express the “reconciliation across the 
graves (Versöhnung über den Gräbern).” They together promulgated a “declaration of Verdun 
(Erklärung von Verdun, Déclaration de Verdun),” stating that with their “joint honoring of the 
dead of past fighting at this historical site they set a mark that both peoples irrevocably have 
embarked on the route of peace, reason, and cooperation in friendship.”116 
With the two leaders standing next to each other at the mortuary of the old Fort Douau-
mont, in the Champagne’s early autumn, there came that stirring gesture which, as Kohl 
later would insist, was neither planned nor staged, and which has been branded ever 
since in the collective memories on both sides of the Rhine: François Mitterrand and 
Helmut Kohl standing hand in hand in the middle of one of Europe’s bloodiest sites, in 
front of coffins covered with French and German flags. 
The picture was widely published in newspapers and magazines, in new editions of 
history books, and on posters for a diverse range of purposes. Arguably, together with the 
picture of Willy Brandt kneeling at the memorial of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970, the picture 
with Kohl and Mitterrand was the most important post-World War II photograph 
containing meaning for Germans. In the Verdun case it was shared Franco-German 
meaning: From the day it was taken, the image of Mitterrand and Kohl hand in hand in 
Verdun became part of the collective Carolingian memory.117 
                                                 
115 Archiv der Gegenwart 1984, 27726. 
116 Dokumente, Documents, and Deutsch-Französisches Institut Ludwigsburg 1993, 78-79. Full text of the de-
claration (my translation): Declaration of Verdun: We have reconciled. We have understood. We have become 
friends. Today, on 22 September 1984, the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the president of 
the French Republic have gathered in Verdun in order to bow down before the graves of France’s and Ger-
many’s sons who fell here. With their joint honoring of the dead of past battles at this historical site they set a 
mark that both people irrevocably have embarked on the route of peace, reason, and cooperation in friendship. 
Ibid. 
117 I do not attempt a ranking of the relative importance of picture-images as part of memory and meaning. 
Other pictures that might rank in the same league in terms of importance are the fraternal kiss between de 
Gaulle and Adenauer after the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in the Elysée palace in 1963, and U.S. pre-
sident John F. Kennedy at the Rathaus Schöneberg in Berlin proclaiming the well known reasons for his pride 
in being a Berliner. 
There is another, mainly French Franco-German image, or sequence of pictures, which pertains to this sec-
Irrespective of whether or not the gesture came spontaneously, the two statesmen, just 
as their predecessors de Gaulle and Adenauer, were quite aware of the symbolic content 
of what they did. The symbolic holding of hands was at once the documentation of a 
past sealed, and an expression of the value of the present’s close relations between the 
two states and peoples, interwoven and interconnected. And the gesture carried a 
promise for the future, as an encouragement and announcement that this relationship 
would bear more and new fruits in the time ahead. That Mitterrand and Kohl 
understood their gesture as such is clearly demonstrated by Mitterrand’s response to a re-
porter’s question some five years later. Reviving a tradition of the Fourth Republic, 
Mitterrand gave a press conference in the Elysée palace in May 1989, where he was again 
asked about the issues and state of affairs in Franco-German relations. His answer to 
one of the questions is particularly telling: 
 
Question: On the walls in Paris one sees these days a rather beautiful poster that shows you hand in hand with 
the Federal Chancellor Kohl. Does the Franco-German cooperation function as well as this poster makes one 
suspect? 
Mitterrand: That is a photograph which was taken in Verdun at an important ceremony of which you surely 
have heard. It is a momentary snapshot, but this momentary snapshot indeed follows suit with the continuity 
of more than 35 years of French and German politics. One should draw no exaggerated conclusions, and yet, it 
is, after all, a symbolic picture, and symbols are not unimportant. We are constantly talking to each other, we 
constantly straighten things out; but that takes place in a climate of trust.118 
 
Historian Horst Möller views the scene through a similar prism: 
 
When the two leading statesmen of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, President François 
Mitterrand and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl stand hand in hand in front of the grave fields near 
Verdun on 22 September 1984, they document the reconciliation at one of the most tragic locations of the 
common history, a location where as hardly anywhere else one becomes aware to what a degree Germans 
and French are not only separated, but also united by a common destiny. With this symbolic act, Kohl and 
Mitterrand turn a place of separation in animosity of the two nations into one of common mourning, 
common destiny:  They declare that both nations have drawn their conclusions from history to put an end 
                                                                                                                                                 
tion’s argument. This is the memory of Kohl’s tears in the Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris in January 1996 dur-
ing the requiem mass in honor of former president François Mitterrand, who had died a few days before on 8 
January. The mass was transmitted live on French and German television, and an extraordinarily large French 
audience watched as the cathedral in the heart of Paris was filled with the world’s political leaders and digni-
taries. One could see many sad faces during that broadcast, but the camera kept returning to Helmut Kohl with 
visible tears for his long-time companion shown again and again. Strikingly, the deep etching of the image has 
remained a powerful presence in the French collective memory. Compare, for example Audibert 1998, 58. 
Kohl’s repeated statement that Europe not only had lost a great statesman, but that he himself had lost a close 
friend whom he had addressed and talked about as “François,” may have cemented the engraving. The picture 
is known in Germany too, although less present than it is in France. In short, this is another picture or memory 
that produces, perpetuates, transports Franco-German meaning. 
118 Mitterrand 1989, 351. 
to the fratricidal fights, and to turn the view to the joint design of the future.119 
 
It is important to grasp the epistemic quantum leap that Kohl and Mitterrand 
symbolically express: They symbolize joint Franco-German mourning of their common 
dead, of losses and wounds that they have both suffered and jointly inflicted upon each 
other. Having killed each other, first, may usher in a shared social meaning of revenge 
and resentment (as after 1871 and 1918). Second, in a state of reconciliation or 
rapprochement, it may lead to a mutual sense of forgiving. The third interpretation of 
past killing, however, is of yet another quality: it is the sense of having hurt oneself by 
having killed each other of a collective identity, however weak, which Kohl and 
Mitterrand symbolize. 
In Verdun, history has drawn its own elliptic epilogue: At the location where on 11 
August 843 Charlemagne’s grandsons had sealed the loss of unity by splitting up the 
empire in an agreement named “Treaty of Verdun,” and where more than a thousand 
years later the family members of the two lines had fought and killed each other the 
most fiercely and most thoroughly, the trenches and the battlefields no longer separate 
the two large Carolingian heirs. Now, the communal commemoration of their common 
dead binds them together. 
 
Self-Referentialism: Commemorating de Gaulle and Adenauer (July and September 1987). Three years 
after the memorable Kohl-Mitterrand encounter in Verdun, just before the Elysée Treaty’s 
twenty-fifth anniversary, it had been a quarter century since Adenauer and de Gaulle had 
undertaken their extended trips to each others’ sides of the Rhine. Making reference to the 
meaning-generating and “identity-producing” trips of 1962, on 5 July 1987 Kohl and Prime 
Minister Chirac together visited de Gaulle’s tomb in the village cemetery in Colombey-les-
                                                 
119 Möller 1998, 59. For a rich and detailed essay on Verdun’s history and symbolic significance fully in support 
of the argument here, see Krumeich 1995. Krumeich calls Verdun “the point of departure toward a new type 
of common Franco-German memory,“ and the act of 1984 of an “immense symbolic range.” Krumeich 1995, 
139. For an account of the symbolic handshake that in some ways diverges from the virtual unanimity of all ac-
counts cited here, see Soeffner 1992, 180-185 and 190-193. Soeffner, however, agrees on the broad basics, 
namely that the handshake was a “ritually outstanding scene,” that the soldiers’ cemetery of Verdun is a “ritual-
ly occupied space,” and that this space became associated with Franco-German “reconciliation and later also 
with friendship.” Soeffner 1992, cf. 180-181. My thanks to Darius Zifonun for bringing this essay to my atten-
tion. 
Deux-Églises.120  On the same day chancellor and prime minister together participated in a 
mass in Reims in celebration of the Franco-German friendship.121 On the following day, 6 
July 1987, the first common Franco-German military officers’ seminar was held at the Ecole 
Militaire in Paris.122  And on 19 September 1987, in Kohl and Chirac’s presence, young 
French and Germans jointly demonstrated in Ludwigsburg, commemorating de Gaulle’s visit 
there and his speech to German youth on 9 September 1962.123  Then, the old president 
spoke of the Franco-German “wholly natural solidarity that of course needs to be 
organized.”124  A quarter century later, there is a good dose of Franco-German self-
referentialism at work. Such self-referentialism, too, reproduces and perpetuates a 
relationship’s meaning and purpose. 
V. Accumulation, Reproduction, Change 
Symbolic practices are not designed to solve political problems or to directly formulate 
interests or positions. Instead, such practices engender meaning and purpose in the relations 
among states, providing social content in the international sphere. Constructing normality, 
providing references for the success of specific actions, and shaping rudiments of 
international collective identity, symbols generate meaning and social purpose that help to 
frame state interests and foster stability and order. 
Without comprehending its symbolic practices, their nature, status, and effects, the 
Franco-German relationship of the 20th century’s last four decades cannot be adequately 
understood, nor can its meaning and purpose be properly captured. Neglecting such 
symbols, and the social meaning that they contribute, means ignoring a major ingredient of a 
fundamental structural element of post-war European affairs. 
Endurance of meaning does not preclude change, either of it or within it. Such 
change may be abrupt. More commonly, however, meaning-structures change when their 
perpetuation patterns transform gradually over time. The reproduction of meaning, while 
ongoing, is never entirely uniform, but usually implies piecemeal mutation. 
At the same time, there seems to be the possibility of accumulation over time. Many 
European observers seem to think along such lines when they speak of France and Germany 
                                                 
120 Ziebura 1997, 329. 
121 Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 92. 
122 Ibid. 
123 See Chirac 1988; Deutsch-Französisches Institut and Deutsche Frankreich-Bibliothek 1995 (and after), 93. 
as an “old marriage” or “old couple.” Perhaps there are a few occurrences, such as Kohl and 
Mitterrand’s holding hands in Verdun in 1984, that stand out. Afterwards things are not 
quite the same as they were before. But such events, too, need to be remembered in order to 
be part of a shared understanding and purpose. If collectively forgotten, they are no longer 
part of the relationship’s meaning-structure. 
Shared meaning and collective memory need to be reproduced in order to continue 
to exist. If the processes that perpetuate them cease or undergo dramatic changes, or if 
shared understandings and purposes are forgotten or fundamentally reinterpreted, meaning-
structures will decay, disappear, or transform. In this sense, the institutionalized meaning 
between France and Germany is a social structure like the Cold War: if it is no longer 
reproduced, it is over. After centuries of rivalry among French and German political entities, 
“hereditary enmity” from 1871 to 1945, and some fifteen years of réconciliation following 
World War II, the dominant Franco-German meaning from the late 1950s on, too, is not 
given by nature. Taking on some historical raw material, it is a social construction that is 
human-made. And as other social constructions it needs to be re-made in order to endure. 
Unless re-created, it is bound to disappear. 
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Abstract 
The relationship between France and Germany after World War II was transformed by the efforts of 
several influential leaders. These leaders – de Gaulle and Adenauer most prominent among them – 
engaged in symbolic acts that generated meaning and social purpose for the two states’ relationship. 
Overcoming their countries’ history of enmity and war, these leaders institutionalized the relationship 
as an end in itself. Later leaders, and then many representatives of the French and German govern-
ments, continually reproduced this social meaning so that  France and Germany became known as 
the “tandem,” “couple,” and “pair.” Despite the importance of such symbolic practices, international 
relations scholarship lacks the conceptual tools to capture them and their meaning, and to grasp their 
effects. In this paper, I build upon existing constructivist thought to elaborate the concept of “pre-
dominantly symbolic acts and practices among states,” and argue that symbols generate and perpetu-
ate social meaning and purpose in the international sphere. With this concept, I explore the specific 
meaning of the bilateral Franco-German post-war relationship, scrutinize the symbolic acts with 
which it initially emerged, analyze the practices that have reproduced and perpetuated it, and examine 
the effects that it has engendered. The conceptual addition that this paper offers provides the means 
to construct a coherent narrative out of the past half century’s manifold symbolic Franco-German 
acts, to comprehend the connectedness of these varied episodes and pieces, and to appreciate the 
social meaning and characteristic effects of these symbolic practices in their entirety. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
